There is a well-established philosophical literature that lays out the ways in which apologies can be inadequate: sometimes failing to achieve their purpose, sometimes making matters worse. This talk explores a related but distinct element of the ethical architecture of apologies. This relates to situations where a party makes an apology to one party to whom they owe an apology, but not to another second party.
My claim is that this wrongs the second party in a way that is not reducible to the straightforward claim that they have not received an apology that was their due. It is true that the second party is wronged in this sense, but this does not tell the full story of the wrongness of the omission. Indeed, it may call into question the meaningfulness of the apology to the first party, even in cases where, at first sight, it may seem as if the apology in question was genuine. In this talk, I seek to explain the further dimensions of the wrong involved in failing to apologise in such circumstances.
